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Introduction 
In recent years, the concept of international competitiveness has (re)emerged as a paradigm in 
public discourse. In this paper I introduce the concept of institutional competitiveness to show how 
the concept of international competition has been reformulated as part of a political project for 
initiating economic globalization. It is my intention to show how the concept of institutional 
competitiveness (CIC) has raised to become important in the last 25 years, moving from a simple 
conversation among academics into a political discussion with real-world effects. The purpose of 
the paper is to describe the rise and movement into the realm of practice. The purpose is also to 
show how the voyage has come to include institutional change as an important policy instrument 
and the use of institutional analysis as a key utensil for policy makers. It is my claim that discourses 
and institutions are used with the intention to enhance the competitiveness of nations and 
enterprises; why discourses and institutions have become a political phenomenon of interest and 
salience for policy makers and decision takers. It is also my claim that knowledge of institutions is 
applied to explain economic growth and to assess the potential relevance of institutional reforms; 
why interpretations of institutions has been become a policy tool for the implementation of 
globalisation. It is this dual role of discourses and institutions I describe in the following. The whole 
debate on the CIC will be looked upon as an example of how institutions (as a political 
phenomenon) and institutional analysis (as a policy tool) have become part of a policy approach. 
Two caveats are necessary. It is not my ambition to describe the conflicts of interests and the 
accidents of history involved in moving the process from dawn to mid-day. Neither is it my 
ambition to explain why the travel has happened in the first place. Even if the process is engulfed in 
conflicts – at several levels and including multiple interests – I will NOT identify these, nor 
describe them. The purpose of the paper is only to describe not to explain.  
The paper will be organised as follows. First, I describe how the concept of national and 
institutional competitiveness is discussed. In order to describe how the concept of competitiveness 
has been redefined over the past 20-25 years I include literature from economic theory and business 
analysis (Aiginger 2006b; Siggel 2006). It is in this context that the concept of Institutional 
Competitiveness is introduced. Second, I trace the institutionalization of the discussion into expert 
systems. Two examples will be emphasized. One is the development of “The post-Washington 
  
consensus” another is The Open Method of Coordination within the EU. The presentation is based 
on a reading of policy papers, reports and other primary sources from international organizations 
and national governments. Third, I point to how the institutionalization has included a number of 
welfare reforms and ignited a process towards the transformation of national welfare states. I draw 
on primary and secondary literature in presenting the concept of competition state (Cerny 1990, 
2007; Stopford et al 1991; Jessop 1994, 2003; Hirsch 1995; but also Rosecranze 1999; Bobbit 2002; 
Weiss 2003). Fourth, and finally, I emphasize how state-society relations have been changed. The 
concept of competitive corporatism (Rhodes 1998; Molina & Rhodes 2002) is employed. 
 
1. The rising discourse on national and institutional competitiveness  
The year 1993 was special for the new interest in international competitiveness. In February 1993, 
President Bill Clinton introduced his first economic programme and spoke of “(…) a global 
economy in which we must compete with people around the world”. In June 1993, the President of 
the European Commission, Jacques Delors, spoke in Copenhagen about the competitive race 
between Europe and the USA2. This was eight years after Peter J. Katzenstein had published Small 
States in World Markets (1985)3, one of the first to link institutions to the competitiveness of 
national economies, and almost three years after Michael E. Porter had published The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations (1990), one of the first to talk about the competition of nations. It was also 
just one year before Paul Krugman, an American economist, counterattacked by calling all the talk 
about the competiveness of nations “a dangerous obsession” (1994). Since then, the concept of 
competitiveness has been one of the most contested in both academic and political discourses 
(Aiginger 2006b). In its travel from academia to a policy approach the concept has changed 
definition several times. In the following I describe how the concept has not only changed but also 
developed to become a discourse. By discourse I mean a realm of meaning ordered to include a 
worldview in which the world (i.e. the relation between nations) is understood to be changed by 
circumstantial causes being linked to circumstantial effects by the working of circumstantial 
                                                 
2 At the meeting in Copenhagen the Commission was asked to submit a white paper on “Global Competitiveness” 
before the European Council’s meeting on 11 December 1993, see “White Paper on Growth, competitiveness and 
employment”, European Council, http://aei.pitt.edu/1139/. 
3 From the very early 1980s comparative political economy together with organizational theory “rediscovered” 
institutions and (re)introduced institutional analysis to social science disciplines. Among the most important 
contributors to bringing back in the institutions one can mention Philippe C. Schmitter (1979); Schmitter & Streeck, 
1985; Aglietta 1976; also Marsh & Olsen (1984 and 1989); see for an overview of literature Campbell (2004). 
  
mechanisms4. David Ricardo’s famous trade model of comparative advantage, the two countries and 
two goods model, was an early attempt to understand how countries compete. It is still the basis for 
mainstream definitions of competition and competitiveness, now together with the extension to n 
countries and n goods made by Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977). Like Ricardo and other 
classical economists they too evaluate the competitiveness of nations using statistics on the factors 
of production (land, capital, natural resources and labour). Thus in mainstream economics: 
• International competition is understood to apply only to industries.  
• The theory of competitive advantage (see review in Siggel 2006) is understood to pertain 
only to economic micro-foundations. 
• The theory likewise is understood to be based on only a few indicators of competitiveness; 
and finally 
• The theory is understood to perceive competitiveness statically or objectively, i.e., ex post or 
as revealed competitiveness (see Balassa 1965 and the index of “revealed comparative 
advantage”).  
 
This was also the definition used by Paul Krugman 1994 when he criticised the concept of “a 
competition of nations”, and when he called Bill Clinton’s belief that every nation is “(…) like a big 
corporation competing in the global marketplace” a dangerous obsession (Krugman 1994). Apart 
from this, it has become clear that Michael E. Porter have had a widespread and profound influence 
on changing the mainstream conception of international competition. Few people today would 
disagree that The Competitive Advantage of Nations5, but especially Porter’s country-based 
empirical studies, policy reports and general world-wide activities (Porter 1998 xvi-xx) have 
contributed to put the idea of national competitiveness on centre stage – and to make national 
governments as well as international organizations aware of the new conception. Still so Porter 
never developed the idea of institutional competitiveness. He even did not point towards institutions 
as an important factor in understanding comparative advantages before his publication 2000 (Porter 
2000). Instead one has to look to comparative political economy to see how institutions before 
Porter was addressed as object of study and taken serious in explaining the comparative advantages 
of particular national or regional economies. Especially Small States in World Markets by Peter J. 
                                                 
4 . As such a discourse is equivalent to a context for rationality - i.e. a worldview in which the world is believed to be 
rational, or understandable through its causal links and mechanisms; see John L. Campbell & Ove K. Pedersen, 2001, ?? 
5 First published 1990, second edition 1998. 
  
Katzenstein was a breakthrough in so far as he – as the first – emphasized institutional differences 
in explaining national competitiveness; also Bringing Back In the State co-edited by Peter Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (1985) must be mentioned as it emphasized the changing 
capacities of states to achieve particular goals (see Theda Skocpol 2008)6. But even if Porter came 
late to understand the role of institutions, his contribution eventually proved decisive in the 
development of the concept that nations compete and to include institutions in the definition of this. 
First of all he lifted the concept from a micro-level to the study of companies embedded in nations 
or other geographic entities (Porter 1998 67f.). He also changed focus from an aggregate and static 
economy-wide approach to emphasising the dynamics of competition and the role of competitive 
strategies (Porter 1998 131-75). By shifting the attention from the micro-level to the meso- and 
macro-level Porter took two steps of critical importance for a redefinition of competitiveness. First, 
he emphasised the importance of the locality in which a company was embedded and that the social, 
political, macroeconomic and legal context had an influence on the competitiveness of firms (Porter 
1998 73-80). He made the context – the national, regional and local – an important condition in 
understanding the comparative advantages of enterprises and also helped to point to public policies 
as important tools to promote advantages or remove disadvantages (Ketels 2006). Hereby Porter 
contributed to combine the mainstream micro-oriented study of the comparative advantages of 
firms with a more macro- or meso-oriented study of the comparative advantages of nations 
(Aiginger 2006a). Second, he emphasised the significance of companies’ capacity or readiness to 
compete. He combined the static or mainstream understanding of competitiveness as a question of 
outcome or revealed performance with a dynamic approach in which the potential of firms to adjust 
to exogenous changes was emphasised. He therefore maintained that “The only meaningful concept 
of competitiveness at the national level is national productivity” (Porter 1998, 6) and thus combined 
a static (ex post) with a dynamic (ex ante) approach, and thereby also combined two questions: (1) 
How is competitiveness created, i.e. what are the main sources of competitiveness, including the 
function of human resources and managerial skills, with (2) How is competitiveness explained, i.e. 
what is the function of the abundance of natural resources, the cheapness of labour, the use of 
technologies, or the production of larger scale (Aiginger 2006b)?  
This combination of micro and macro, static and dynamic was forcefully supported by the now 
famous diamond model of “The Determinants of National Advantage” (Porter 1998, 71-3, 173-75). 
In this model Porter emphasised the micro-foundations of competitiveness and retained the 
                                                 
6 Also to be mentioned is Lindblom 1977; Hirschman 1981, 1992; and North 1990. 
  
enterprise or the clusters of firms at the centre for the measuring and analysis of national 
competitiveness. Porter held that “The basic unit of analysis for understanding is the industry” 
(Porter 1998, 33), which in itself was decisive because it embedded the firm in a context of 
institutions and made the linkage (or complementarity) of company strategy and policy inputs 
important for enhancing, but also explaining, the competitiveness of firms (Grilo & Koopman 2006, 
82; Kohler 2006, 104-13). By the same token he introduced the relationship between business and 
politics (Ketels 2006, 124); and by emphasising business as embedded in politics (or business-as-
the-core-of-politics), he also assisted in changing the concept which John Maynard Keynes in 
particular had introduced. In contrast to Keynes, who sought to formulate the means by which 
governments could stabilise and fine-tune free markets (i.e. using policies to set macroeconomic 
frameworks for free markets), Porter emphasised the necessity of complementarity or linkages 
between politics and business (macro and micro). Doing so he pioneered a set of questions which 
subsequently gained an influence, the force of which can be compared with the life work of John 
Maynard Keynes (Skidelsky 1994, 2001)! Like Keynes, Porter has acted as a policy adviser to 
governments. And like Keynes he has been a fervent participant in the public and political debate. It 
is also this combination of academic application and policy involvement which has distinguished 
the subsequent development of Porter’s book. I now describe this development in order to show 
how a perception of competitiveness, which will subsequently be defined as institutional 
competitiveness, has been created. For the purpose I use Eckhard Siggel’s review of the current 
theoretical history of the two concepts of competition and comparative advantages (Siggel 2006, 
137-59). Like Siggel and others (see special issue of Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 
2006), I mix contributions from academia with contributions from international organisations as 
well as national policy markers, thereby emphasising three argumentative points: Firstly, that at the 
present there is no accepted or mainstream definition of competitiveness, but that a large number of 
definitions have been proposed (Spence & Hazard 1988); secondly, that debates on the 
understandings are actually occurring in a epistemic community (Haas 1992) in which there is 
participation from academics, consultants and policy makers (for a survey, see Cantwell 2005); and 
thirdly, that classical and neoclassical trade theory tends to use the concept of comparative 
advantage, while international organisations as well as the business literature more often is inclined 
to use the concept of competitiveness without it being evident whether this is of any significance for 
my description at all! Based on an extensive reading of both academic and policy sources it can be 
concluded that the definition of competitiveness has developed:  
  
 
• From emphasising only micro-foundations for comparative advantages to mixing micro- and 
macro-foundations, as when monetary costs, and not only the costs of production factors, are 
included, and the real or the effective exchange rate is understood to be an important factor 
in measuring competitiveness (Lipschitz & McDonald 1991). 
• From emphasising only one dimension, and then primarily the real cost of production 
factors, to include multi-dimensions, as when technology as a condition reflected, for 
example, by R&D expenditure is included (Fagerberg 1988), or when Porter in his diamond 
model includes production and demand conditions as well as company strategy and rivalry 
among firms and other determinants of comparative advantage. 
• From a static understanding measured by the outcome of competition or market shares, for 
example, to a mix of static and dynamic indicators such as changes over time in GDP (gross 
domestic product) per capita, or in market shares, as when Krugman used market share over 
time as an indicator of U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing (Krugman & Hatsopoulos 
1987). 
• From a deterministic reading of competitiveness where the absolute level of productivity, 
the annual growth rate or the average income generated is taken as an objective indicator of 
(ex post or revealed) performance, to a more stochastic (ex ante or strategic) understanding, 
where the ability to create competitiveness through R&D investments, human resource 
developments, innovation, etc. is emphasised; and finally. 
• From a positive (measured by objective indicators) towards a more normative (measured by 
including political or subjective goals) understanding of competitiveness framed, for 
example, in terms of “(…) a country’s ability to generate sustained economic well-being for 
its citizens (…)” (Kohler 2006, 87), or the ability of a country to create “environmental 
quality”, to “increase standards of living”, or briefly “the ability to create welfare” (Aiginger 
2006b, 163). 
 
Even if the new conception seems to have moved the understanding of international competition far 
away from the Ricardian trade model, the classical model seems untouched. Instead of being 
criticised the traditional trade model is being extended - by adding extra levels (meso- and macro-), 
new dimensions (technology, the advantages of large-scale operation) and further approaches 
(dynamic, stochastic, normative). This development from a simple to a more complex 
  
understanding is even more evident when we include the international organisations and their 
definition of competiveness. Reviews of international organizations show that competitiveness is 
defined in various ways and that definitions have changed over time (see review done by National 
Competitiveness Council 20047). The most important development though is the acceptance that firms 
are embedded in a locality, and that economic, legal and institutional factors associated with the 
locality have an influence on the comparative advantages (or disadvantages) of companies. It has 
thus become possible not only to include additional and new dimensions and to open up for 
different approaches in measuring competitiveness. It has also become possible to see the 
importance of the institutional environment for firms. The context has changed from macro-
economic regulation (i.e. national labour market policies or central wage agreements etc.) to the 
institutional (legal, economic and political) environment, to include not only policy regulation but 
all relevant institutional factors. At the same time, the number of relevant and used indicators has 
been increased8. If we compare the theoretical debate and the international organisations’ 
definitions, it is clear then that the gradual redefining of international competitiveness has 
introduced institutions and institutional analysis in several ways. First, it has become accepted that 
institutions set the framework for the comparative advantages of firms (Porter 2000); why it is now 
possible to reflect on institutions (i.e. institutional analysis) and to use this reflection as a policy 
tool9. Second, the development from micro- to macro-foundations has extended the number of 
players, institutional levels and policy arenas of relevance to the study of comparative advantages; 
why the strategic interaction of economic and political players and the complementarity (or not) of 
institutions has become central to the explanation of comparative advantages (Crouch 2005, 46-73; 
Hall & Soskice 2001, 17; Amable 2003, 58-66, Kohler 2006). Third, this development has made the 
question of “institutional change” a phenomenon of interest to policy makers, and the capability to 
implement institutional reforms (or not) an important indicator of competitiveness. In all three 
ways, institutions have come to be central to the question of the competition of nations, and 
institutional analysis has been introduced to explain, but also to promote, comparative advantages. 
 
2. The institutionalization of the discourse on institutional competitiveness into expert systems  
                                                 
      7 http://www.forfas.ie/ncc/reports/ncc_annual_01/approach.htm 
8 For a more systematic review of scholarly contributions to the debate on competitiveness, see Siggel 2006, 144. 
9  And at the same time make concepts like “the comparative institutional advantage” fully meaningful (Hall & Soskice 
2001, 36-44). 
  
The development of the new conception is contested - of course. Even so Karl Aiginger asserts that 
a consensus on how competitiveness is to be defined and measured is now being created. He 
believes that the consensus will combine “process competitiveness” (“(…) analysing 
competitiveness as an ability or a capability to create welfare”) with “outcome competitiveness” 
(analysing competitiveness “(…) as the welfare of a nation”) (Aiginger 2006b, 162) and find 
arguments in the fact that classical and neo-classical trade theories are being combined and mixed 
to include normative, dynamic and stochastic approaches. He also find arguments in the fact that a 
“Washington Consensus” between the organisations IMF, World Bank (WB) and U.S. Treasury 
Department was developed in the 1980s leading to a process in which the concept that nations 
compete was institutionalized. How this institutionalisation proceeded will now become more 
apparent when two elements in the process are described. Hence my description of the history of a 
discourse is now changed from the level of discourse to the level of the institutionalization of the 
discourse. The first element covers how a number of expert systems are established to compare the 
competitiveness of nations. By establishment I mean the construction of expert systems with the 
purpose of comparing the competitiveness of nations. This kind of institutionalization can be 
politically decided, as when the European Council in 1994 (by resolution of 21 November) decided 
to strengthen the “competitiveness of Europe” and the Commission commenced to publish the 
European Competitiveness Report in 1995. It can also be privately decided as when McKinsey 
Global Institute was established in 1990 “(…) to assess the productivity performance and 
competitiveness of countries and sectors relative to global benchmarks”10. As of today there are 
numerous international organisations which systematically carry out international comparisons of 
national competitiveness11. Also a number of national, public and private organisations are 
contributing to the growing industry (for an overview see Bäcklund & Werr 2001). The US 
government was the first to take an initiative. It happened in 1985, when President Ronald Reagan 
established the President’s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness12. The Competitiveness 
                                                 
10 http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/rp/CSProductivity/ 
11 The World Economic Forum (where Michael Porter played an important role) started in 1979 to publish the annual 
Global Competitiveness Report. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) did so with the World Economic Outlook in 
1980 after having carried out multilateral monitoring since 1979. The Institute for Management Development (IMD) 
started 1989 to publish the World Competitiveness Yearbook. The European Commission in 1995 began to publish The 
European Competitiveness Report. In 1992 the Commission established The Observatory of European Small and 
Medium Size Industries to carry out a detailed screening of the competitiveness of individual sectors of manufacturing 
industry in the EU. The OECD’s Global Forum on Competition had its first meeting in 2001; since 2005 the 
Organisation has published Going for Growth. The OECD started to publish OECD Economic Outlook in 1966 and 
number 82 was published in 2007. 
  
Policy Council was subsequently established in 1988, but abolished in 1997. Ten years later (in 
1998), the Irish government established the National Competitiveness Council (NCC), which has 
since published the Annual Competitiveness Report. In 2000 the NCC introduced the report 
Competitiveness Challenge to convey policy recommendations to government and social partners13. 
After Ireland established the Competitiveness Council, several other governments followed suit - 
Greece in 2003, Croatia in 2004, Bahrain in 2005, the Philippines in 2006, and Guyana and the 
Dominican Republic in 2007. In all instances advisory bodies or special government agencies were 
established to tackle competitiveness issues through international comparisons. Also private think 
tanks were established; above all in the USA, where the Council on Competitiveness was 
established in 198614; but also in France where the semi-public think tank Coe-Rexecode in 2006 
started the publication of an annual report on La compétitivité francaise15.   Private consultancies 
likewise became interested in the competitiveness of nations of which the McKinsey Global 
Institute (established 1990) is the most prominent example. Additional examples can be given, 
including from countries such as Germany, England, Sweden, Denmark, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Sri Lanka. These examples are, however, plenty to illustrate the extent to which the concept has 
gained ground, and how far its institutionalisation has progressed.  
How this institutionalisation proceeded will now become more apparent when the second element 
in the process of institutionalisation is included. This element covers how existing economic and 
political institutions are changed in order to develop and to disseminate the concept of the 
competition of nations. By development I mean when already existing expert systems come to 
include mechanisms which usually characterise knowledge systems, for example systematic data 
collection, forecasting based on model calculations, and a process of verification or falsification 
relative to demonstrated developments. By dissemination I define when expert systems are 
deliberately equipped to feature a geographic dispersal of the concept to make the concept 
applicable to even more international organisations, and to even more national governments, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
12 Which also gave Porter the inspiration to develop and extend the concept of competitiveness, and led him to write 
The Comparative Advantage of Nations (Porter 1998, xii). 
13 In doing so the Council has changed the definition of competitiveness several times; for example in the last two years 
(2005–2007) alone, the well-known Competitiveness Pyramid developed by the Council has been redefined on 
important points. 
14  http://www.compete.org/about-us/ 
15 See Coe-Rexecode, 2007, La compétitivité francaise en 2007, Document de travail no. 3. In this report data from the 
IMF, WB, the European Commission and Ernst and Young is put to use. 
  
regional councils or bodies (Boli & Thomas 1999; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Meyer 2000) 16. This type 
of institutionalization occur when for example the IMF, provide technical assistance and training of 
national officials, researchers and others in order to enable them to compile, manage, disseminate 
and improve national data. This as other examples will illustrate the extent to which the concept has 
gained further ground but also indicate that the institutionalisation has passed a threshold where it is 
no longer sensible to discuss whether the concept of competition of nations make any sense or not. 
But where it has become more sensible to discuss the indicators, the data and the models most 
appropriate to measure degrees of competitiveness. What follows is a description of how expert 
systems have come to include mechanisms for an on going development and dissemination of the 
concept of competition of nations. Two examples will be presented. The first is “The post-
Washington Consensus”, or how the IMF and the WB came to include an extended understanding 
of institutions as a production factor.17 The second is the introduction of a radically new type of 
governance dubbed The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) by the European Union, which also 
came to include institutions as an explanatory factor, but more importantly came to introduce a 
stochastic method for institutional change. Both examples are directed towards the macro and micro 
levels and assume that institutions create comparative advantages (or disadvantages) for industries, 
and that institutions can be changed by willed and wanted action.  
2.1. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
From 2003, the IMF began to assume that institutions set the framework for comparative 
advantages. This renewed understanding of institutions was part of “The post-Washington 
Consensus” in which the IMF and the WB have come to agree that the first “Washington 
Consensus” was incomplete, and that countries need to move beyond “first generation” 
macroeconomic and trade reforms to a stronger focus on institutional reforms, including the 
elimination of red tape through administrative reforms, and the strengthening and building of “good 
institutions” (in areas like justice, education, training and innovation). “The post-Washington 
                                                 
16 It is important to notice that by dissemination I DO NOT intend to claim that the concept that nations compete are 
actually diffused. I have no proof of such an effect, nor any need to claim it. The only point put forward is this: That a 
number of mechanisms for the development and the dissemination are established which I take as proof of the intention 
of WB and IMF to diffuse the concept and to develop it to become accepted and used by even  more governments and 
international organizations.  
17 See the definition of the concept at http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story074/en/index.html. See also the 
justification for and introduction of the concept in Joseph E. Stieglitz, “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Toward a 
Post Washington Consensus”, The 1998 Wider Annual Lecture, Helsinki, Finland, January 7, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/stig.htm; and Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz 2008. 
  
Consensus” then was far more sensitive to institutional effects and the importance of institutional 
variations than the original18. In the September 2004 issue of the annual World Economic Outlook, 
the IMF examines the role of institutions by reviewing the established knowledge of institutions, the 
impact of institutions and the role of institutional change and of “good institutions” in establishing 
conditions for economic growth (WEO, chapter III). The review is based mainly on econometric 
studies of institutions and on institutions defined as preference structure. This in combination leads 
the IMF to asses the role of institutions in a number of economies, including emerging, transitional 
and developed economies. It also brings the organization to establish a new set of expert systems 
(databases, indicators) in the assessment of “the quality of institutions” (see chapter III, Appendix 
3.1, “Sample Composition, Data Sources, and Methods”, pp. 152-56). Together with the WB, the 
IMF thus integrates institutional analysis into their assessments and policy recommendations, and 
does so by posing questions which previously have only been central to neo-institutional theory in 
academia. For example: What are the main factors that drive these changes? How much the 
institutional context does explains of the differences in the competitiveness of particular economies 
(ibid 125)? The approach chosen by IMF and the WB is macro-and micro-oriented: Institutions are 
looked upon as a context for individual decision making in a situation of competition. It is also 
static as well as dynamic: The role of institutions is measured by revealed comparative advantages 
and the transition of institutions by change in several indicators of comparative advantages. Finally, 
it is positive (competitiveness is measured by objective indicators like GDP per capita) as well as 
normative - the IMF is advocating the establishment of “good institutions” or “good governance”. 
Hence the IMF and WB is taking part in the development of the Concept of Institutional 
Competitiveness (CIC) by establishing new institutions and organisations, and by creating new 
indicators; new models and new organizations to formulate and implement new policy programmes. 
In 2006, for example, the IMF and the WB established a new institution called multilateral 
consultations “(…) designed to bring small groups of countries together to discuss a specific 
international economic or financial problem that directly involves them and to settle on a course of 
action to address it.”19 The IMF also began to expand the analytical apparatus on which the World 
Economic Outlook (World Economic Outlook, 2004, chapter III, appendix 3.1.) was based.  
 
2.2. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
 
                                                 
18 Thanks to John L. Campbell for pointing to the difference between the two.  
19 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm#do 
  
The same mix of dimensions, angles and indicators is applied in the Open Method of Coordination 
introduced by the EU in 2000. The two, the IMF and OMC, differ however on one important point. 
Where the OMC is designed to enable mutual learning20, and to do so by initiating stochastic and 
iterative processes for institutional change, the IMF and the WB tend only to use traditional 
mechanisms of coercive, mimetic or normative diffusion to convince national governments on how 
to change institutions. Because the OMC is designed to facilitate semi-voluntary forms of 
coordination (Scott & Trubek 2002) and to further iterative processes of mutual learning it is the 
most important example of the two in demonstrating how the concept of nations compete have 
come to included institutions (as a political phenomenon) and institutional analysis (as a policy 
tool). The OMC can be traced back to the European Commission’s White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment (1993), and represents a regulatory method for constructing what 
later became labelled Social Europe. The white paper was followed by the “European Employment 
Strategy” (EES) known as the “Luxembourg process” (1997), introduced in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997). The OMC is based on the ambition of making the European Union into “… the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustained 
economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council 2000). 
Apart from the fact that the European Employment Strategy mixes the classic understanding of 
international competitiveness21 with normative, dynamic and stochastic aspects, it also opens for a 
wider use of institutional analysis as a tool for institutional change and for a more complex 
understanding of institutions as an explanatory factor (Radaelli 2003; Borrás & Jacobsson 2004; a). 
This happens in three ways: 
 
(1) Institutions are viewed as enabling, but also constraining, comparative advantages. In the 
mid-1990s the EES emerged from a situation with high levels of unemployment and low 
levels of ability to restructure labour markets (Trubek & Mosher 2003, 34-36; Goetschy 
2003, 62f.). Mass unemployment challenged national governments to coordinate a number 
of policies, to coordinate local, regional and national decision-making processes, and to cut 
across traditional boundaries between industrial relations and welfare policies. The EES in 
                                                 
20 The OMC was defined by the Portuguese EU Presidency in its conclusions from the European Council 2000 as 
“mutual learning processes”: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm. 
  
21 The European Commission in the annual European Competiveness Reports generally defines international 
competitiveness as: “… to mean high and rising standards of living of a nation (or a group of nations) with the lowest 
possible level of involuntary unemployment, on a sustainable basis.”  
  
these circumstances was developed as a way for the Union to deal with challenges which the 
member states were unable to face themselves (Kenner 1999).  
(2) In the search for solutions, a great number of different players, policy areas and 
institutional levels are declared relevant. From the start, the EES was designed to establish 
semi-voluntary forms of coordination between supranational and national authorities and 
between political institutions and social partners. It was designed to “(…) potentially 
reinforce established practices of social concentration and negotiated governance in reform 
of work and welfare at EU, national, and sub-national levels, from the European social 
dialogue through national social pacts to territorial employment pacts and local or plant-
level collective agreements” (Zeitlin 2003, 5f.). It included multiple levels of institutions, 
crossed boundaries between different policy arenas (labour market, social, education, 
training, and several other traditional policy fields), and pointed to economic, political and 
social players as relevant. Since the formulation of EES, the open method of coordination 
has been developed to cover EU policy-making in other policy areas such as pensions, 
health care, social inclusion, macro-economic management, education and lifelong training 
to “(…) become a virtual template for EU policy-making in other complex, politically-
sensitive areas (…)” (Zeitlin 2003, 5)22. There has also been a comprehensive 
institutionalisation and organisation of procedures and processes for the development and 
extension of the EES (the European Employment Policy). These changes have taken place 
especially at the administrative level under the European Council and the Commission, 
where the European Employment Committee (EMCO) was established in 1997, and the 
European Social Protection Committee (SPC) and the Advisory Committee on Vocational 
Training (ACVT) was so in 2000. All three are comprised of officials from the national 
administrations, and in some cases even of representatives from social partners (Jacobsson 
& Vifell 2005). Administrative organisations and functions are also established nationally, 
and in some cases social partners are consulted in connection with the development of 
national reform programmes (e.g. in Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, 
and Luxembourg) (called National Action Plans until 2005, European Commission 2002; 
see also European Commission, White Paper on EU Governance 2001). New 
institutionalisations can also be found regionally and locally (see Regalia 2003 for 
                                                 
22 See also ibid. for a description of the differences in use of the OMC within different policy areas. 
  
summary) just like new databases based on new indicators are developed (Zeitlin 2005b)23. 
This was first done on the basis of the Lisbon process and then on an ongoing basis, but 
again to a greater extent when the Lisbon process was reformulated in 2005. 
(3) Institutional analysis is introduced as a tool for boosting institutional change. Each year, the 
European Council adopts common European guidelines; member states report national 
employment policies to the council; and the Council evaluates and reviews these “National 
Reform Programmes” and gives recommendations back to member states. The iterative 
nature of the process and the use of benchmarking, evaluations, review processes and the 
absence of legal sanctions create significant room for national diversity24. This also means 
that reflections on institutions are turned into a tool for institutional change. The iterative 
process is deliberately used to promote common frames of reference, to disseminate good 
practice, to shape the interests of governments and social partners, and to promote mutual 
learning, i.e. to push member states to reflect upon the institutional conditions for 
institutional change (Ferrara, Hemerijck & Rhodes 2003).  
 
In this manner, institutions are given a central position in the creation of comparative advantages. 
And an institutional approach is used to indicate relevant policy players and policy arenas. In the 
same manner institutional analysis is used to intervene in existing institutional landscapes with the 
purpose of changing institutions. Institutional analysis in short is used to change the incentives and 
motivations of governments and of social partners; as well as to alter incentives and motivations of 
employers and employees, of unemployed and employed, – i.e. all the social categories deemed 
relevant for creating comparative advantages. This two-level process of changing incentives and 
motivations is highlighting the role of reflection on institutions and of institutions as a productive 
factor. It is also on this background I have chosen “the post-Washington Consensus” and the OMC 
as two cases in which the use of the concept of CIC becomes meaningful. In both cases, institutions 
are introduced as an important aspect in explaining and featuring international competitiveness, 
making it appropriate to talk about the institutional competitiveness of nations, and to do so in step 
with the inclusion of institutions at three levels to explain and produce not only a discourse and 
institutions, but actual policy programmes and strategies: (1) A context for competition, i.e. 
                                                 
23 See e.g. EMCO Indicators Group 2008. 
24 See description of OMC Trubek & Mosher 2003, 40; and reference to evaluation of the OMC, High Level Group, 
chaired by Wim Kok, Facing the Challenge. The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment, November 2004; see also 
literature review, Zeitlin 2003. 
  
explanation of institutional comparative advantages, (2)  Levels of agency and roles of players, i.e. 
number and character of competitors; and (3) Process of coordination, i.e. complementarity (or non-
complementarity) of institutions. The really special point about this development is that conflicts 
about how to define competitiveness and competitive advantages have been institutionalised and is 
now turned into an iterative process for the formulation of policies. The very fact that the OMC 
recognises that both concepts are contested and have become politicised, makes conflicts about their 
definition and the interpretation an integrative part of the OMC.  
 
3. The institutionalization of the discourse of institutional competitiveness into the state 
 
The OMC is one of many transnational networks established between national authorities and 
international organisations. It is also one of many examples of how the concept that nations 
compete has diffused to become not only a discourse for and among international organizations but 
also a remedy for how national governments are reforming their welfare states and public sectors. In 
this section I discuss the rise of the so-called competition state, by which I understand: When the 
national states – their policies, organisation, and governance arrangements – are stably and 
enduringly changed with the explicit goal of enhancing the competitiveness of the nation by the 
state establishing comparative advantages for national industries and services. The definition 
emphasises that the appearance of a competition state is the result of willed and wanted national 
reforms; but also that reforms are a result of the dissemination and the development of the concept 
that nations compete25. Once again, it is the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact to which reference can be made. It is especially in the European Council, White Paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment from 1993 and the following year in the European 
Commission, White Paper on an European Social Policy that the EU Commission for the first time 
emphasises the necessity of reforming the welfare states. It is also here – for the first time – it 
explicitly is building its arguments on the concept of “global competitiveness”. In any event it is in 
the year 2000, seven years later at the Lisbon meeting, that the European Council accepted to link 
the “global competition” and state reforms, and did so by declaring the ambition to “Build an 
                                                 
25 The definition emphasises the fact that all “capitalist states” do not necessarily take the form of competition states, 
and that only empirical investigations can decide which states do so and to what extent. Only empirical studies can 
decide from where inspiration for reforms arises, and by which mechanisms the reforms are formulated an implemented 
(Campbell & Pedersen 2007b). In any event it is worth emphasising from a time perspective, that there is simultaneity 
in when the debate about reforming the European Social Model (and nation states) emerges in the EU, and when it 
occurs in some of the member states. 
  
Active Welfare State” and to “Modernise the European Social Model”. Hence from 2000 onwards 
there has been a politically accepted link established between the assertion that there is a 
competition of nations, and that because of this the national welfare states must be reformed (Sapir 
et al. 2003; Aiginger 2005). It is also on the basis of this that the European Council since has 
extended the OMC process to a great number of other policy areas, making the Lisbon strategy the 
most important in guiding and developing social reform processes in the member states (Zeitlin 
2005b, Borrás & Jacobsson 2004). Among these, the use of Broad Economic Guidelines within the 
Economic and Monetary Union is of particularly importance. Since 2006, macroeconomic 
guidelines (EMU) have been synchronised with employment guidelines (EES), and both guidelines 
are now following the same triennial cycle making it possible for the national governments to 
coordinate their national employment reforms with macroeconomic issues26. 
Through transnational relations, thus, a “bridge” is established between how international 
organizations are institutionalising the CIC and how national governments are reacting to this. 27 
But the most important point is the general understanding on which the bridge is established: That 
reforming the national welfare states is undertaken with the deliberate intention of producing 
comparative advantages in competition with (especially) the USA; and that the member states are 
left to use two institutional factors to produce comparative advantages: (1) To reform the 
institutional context for enterprises (the external flexibility); and (2) to change the incentives and 
interests of all relevant firms and employees (the internal flexibility) These two levels later became 
the issue of many national reforms. They took the concept that nations compete from discourse and 
institutionalization to become policies for the transformation of welfare states. They also led to 
changes in the existing policies by emphasizing the need to reform the institutional environment for 
firms (external flexibility) and to change the incentives and motivations of employees (the internal 
flexibility). Last but not least they put emphasize on flexibility and “flexibilization” and led to 
“flexicurity” to become the preferred European Employment Strategy. The available literature – 
especially the primary – is enormous. Thus the ambition is only to describe how institutions are 
becoming a political phenomenon and institutional analysis a policy tool in joint efforts of EU and 
member states from 2000 an onwards: 
                                                 
26 This has lead to intense discussions among academics of whether or not there a mutual learning based on OMC and 
whether this is leading to real changes in the organization of member states? Some give positive answers Zeitlin 2005b, 
Jacobsson 2004; Nedergaard 2006, 2007; European Commission 2002, 9-15, Zeitlin & Sabel 2007; others less so 
Scharpf 2002; Alesina & Perotti 2004; Casey & Gold 2005; Kaiser & Prange 2005. 
27 Transnational connections are here defined as stable and enduring contacts and forms of participation between 
national and international, private and public players where one or more of the participants are not subject to any 
political control from their own government (Jacobsson et al. 2004, 27-48). 
  
(1) External flexibility: To reform the institutional environment of firms. From the 1980s supply 
side management became important and a new set of policy measures were created 
emphasising external institutional flexibility. A search for the optimal labour market 
institutions became a core objective28. Since the 1990s then, a great number of national 
reforms have been negotiated and decided on the basis of arguments concerning external 
flexibility29.These reforms concern the strictness of employment protection, the generosity 
of social protection systems, and the spending on active labour market measures. But even if 
all countries have chosen to follow their own model for external flexibility and preferred to 
establish their own strategy for institutional reforms, it is characteristic that the institutional 
context for firms is at the centre of these reforms, and that the object is the removal of 
institutional rigidities and the creation of institutional flexibility. It is also typical that all 
countries (including the Anglo-liberal England, Canada and the USA) have chosen to 
combine external flexibility with social protection (see European Commission 2007 for 
description of country models, Annex II; also OECD 2006a). But it is equally characteristic 
that some have chosen more actively to combine flexibility and social security in an attempt 
to create “flexicurity”30. As early as 1997, the European Council was, however, emphasising 
the necessity of creating “Flexibility with Security”, which was done in connection with 
adoption of the Luxembourg Process (Trubek & Mosher 2003, 42). The European 
Commission though did not designate flexicurity as a European strategy until 2007: “Rather 
than job security, flexicurity focuses on ‘employment security’. Employment security means 
staying in employment, within the same enterprise or in a new enterprise. The philosophy 
behind flexicurity is that workers are more prepared to make such moves if there is a good 
safety net” (European Commission 2007, 7). During 20 years, flexicurity thus moved from 
being a national approach to external flexibility (mainly in the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark) to become – as we will see – a European strategy for the combination of external 
and internal flexibility (Jørgensen & Madsen 2007, 9-32). In the same period, the European 
                                                 
28 Especially for a number of European states among which the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland are 
important examples. 
29 Significant examples are labour market reforms in Hungary 2001, the Hartz reforms in Germany 2002, and the 
introduction of “flexicurité à la française” early 2008 in France. 
30 Formulated for the first time as the best strategy by the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Ad 
Melkert, in a memorandum, Flexibility and security, Second Chamber 1995-6, No. 24 543: see 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/06/feature/nl9706116f.htm. This was done in some cases via special 
legislation (e.g. the Flexibility and Security Act in the Netherlands 1999; see Wilthagen & Tros 2004). In other cases it 
was done by a series of compromises between the government and social partners, which found expression in both 
legislation and general agreements (e.g. in Denmark from 1987 onwards; see Pedersen 2006a). 
 
  
single market set a barrier to strong planning ties between state and firms, and the EMU put 
pressure on state-society relations by making competitive devaluation impossible. Instead, 
firms started to build collaborative ties with customers, local institutions and suppliers 
(Kristensen & Zeitlin 2005), and to establish collaborative ties to local labour markets, local 
welfare providers and local clusters of enterprises.  
(2)  Internal flexibility: To change incentives and motivations. From the mid-1990s, human 
resource management was emphasised, and the coordination of external and internal 
flexibility became an explicit goal. Both in some national policies and in the EU, the 
necessity of combining the external reforms with internal ones was emphasised. The 
individual citizen in particular became an object of policy measures. The goal was “(…) to 
ensure the continual adaptability and employability of workers” (European Commission 
2007, 12) by making human beings more responsive to constantly changing requirements 
and conditions. This development followed two routes. One was in the direction of creating 
institutions. The other was in the direction of introducing a life span (or life course) 
perspective. The emergence of institutions (entitlements, rules and norms) for internal 
flexibility can be found in Sweden and Denmark from the 1980s and simultaneously or later 
in Norway, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands, where a number of new social rights were 
introduced31. Especially by using collective agreements, later on formalised by lawmaking 
or a combination of both. Also new rules were also established, in general established by 
collective agreements, or by company-specific agreements32. Finally, new norms were 
constructed, this time by specific company agreements or within specific sectors33. The 
development of the life course perspective, on the other hand, is more difficult to trace. 
Discussions on the role of transitional labour markets can be found both in Germany in the 
1990s and in Canada even earlier34. This is worth emphasising because the European 
Commission in 2007 put the two together in an obvious attempt to combine the static 
(Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands) understanding of flexicurity with the dynamic (Anglo-
liberal) understanding of mobility. In the definition of the European Commission, 
“Flexibility, on the one hand, is about successful moves (‘transitions’) during one’s life 
                                                 
31  To transferable pension entitlements, (re)training, parental leave, various leaves for education, and health 
assessments etc. 
32 For phased retirement, transferable skills, “time banking accounts”, employment assessment, flexible working time 
arrangements, and for part-time work. 
33 These concern norms for physical health training, individual coaching, and other sorts of fringe benefits. 
34 Klammer 2004; Bernard & Boucher 2007; on transitional labour markets see Gazier 2007. 
  
course: from school to work, from one job to another, between unemployment and work, and 
from work to retirement. (…) On the other hand, it is more than just the security to maintain 
one’s job: it is about equipping people with the skills that enable them to progress in their 
working lives, and helping them find new employment. It is also about adequate 
unemployment benefits to facilitate transitions. Finally, it encompasses training 
opportunities for all workers, especially the low skilled and older workers.” (European 
Commission 2007, 10). 35From the end of 2007, then, the search for optimum life span 
contribution to the GDP is the official goal of the European Employment Strategy (EES). 
And it is precisely in this context that the concept of “the active welfare state” has been 
introduced. The task of the welfare state is to “make transitions pay” or to facilitate 
transitions in the lifespan of the individual, and to do so by helping citizens to overcome 
transitions (e.g. from school to job, or from job to (re)education) by providing social 
services enabling families to work, or by making it possible for families and individuals to 
share the social risk of transitional labour markets with others36. 
From the year 2000 external and internal flexibility has become major targets for EU as well as for 
member states. In the process institutions has grown to be an important political phenomenon and 
institutional analysis key policy tools. The concept that nations compete has moved from simple 
conversations among academics into real political discussions with real-world effects – on policies 
and states. 
4. The institutionalization of the discourse of institutional competitiveness into state-society 
relations 
                                                 
35 The mix of an external and internal measures, and of a dynamic and static approach, makes it obvious to see 
flexicurity as an explicit attempt to manage the complementarities of three institutions – the labour law, the 
unemployment insurance regime and the labour market policies, and to coordinate the relation between three players – 
the firms, the employers and the state (Boyer 2006, 18). But it can also be looked upon as a way of transferring social 
risks from the welfare state (or the family) to individuals or social groups (Schmid 2006), and to do so by entitling 
workers to choose and to manage their own transitions during the whole life cycle, i.e. “to equip people for the markets” 
(Gazier 2007, 110); or in the words of the European Commission “(…) to ensure the continual adaptability and 
employability of workers.” (European Commission 2007, 12). 
36 New studies are pointing to the Scandinavian countries for positive examples of how welfare provisions can facilitate 
transitions in terms of life course (OECD 2005). Also Ireland among other countries are debating how to establish a 
“developmental welfare state” (National Economic Council 2005, chapter 6 and 7) following these lines. 
 
  
This it not all though! In the process of introducing flexibilization (external and internal) stat-
society relations has been changed. The manufacturing of external and international flexibility is 
made possible through the establishment of managerial or process flexibility. While Post-war neo-
corporatist wage and income policy-bargaining systems (Katzenstein 1985, Schmitter 1974, 1982, 
Therborn 1998) were adapted and developed from the 1950s, a shift away from legislated, rule-
governed, and mostly centralised wage bargaining took place from the 1990s. Instead new forms of 
negotiated governance were introduced. Mostly they were based on the ambition to create process 
flexibility, i.e. to establish routines for how to deliberately manage relations between the state and 
social partners to establish comparative advantages by coordinating policies and institutions. In 
most cases it was national governments that took the first initiatives to change the original neo-
corporatist arrangements. And then followed by years of harsh confrontations between governments 
and labour unions and trade organizations; like in England in the beginning of the 1980s, or in 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands from the mid-1980s, or in Germany and France even later. 
But even though confrontations was not ignited by changes in the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) it was (probably?) the constraints imposed by EMU that emphasized the need for 
governments’ and social partners alike to establish consensus-seeking arrangements as important 
mechanisms to produce comparative advantages. Anyway new forms of corporatism were 
established from the mid-1990s integrating social partners with governments in ways to coordinate 
multiple policies within the framework of EES. The basic ambition was a belief in process 
flexibility, or in governance as an important tool for creating comparative advantages in the on-
going competition of nations. But even if governance has become a catch word for the EU and 
national governments alike, each country has followed its own historical path (see Rhodes 2003, for 
overview) in changing state-society relations. Countries with a tradition for neo-corporatist 
arrangements (Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, and to some degree also the Netherlands) 
have adapted these to new conditions. In other cases like Sweden central negotiating institutions 
have been entirely abolished and bargaining been transferred to cross-sectoral bipartite agreement, 
while England has changed from sectoral to company bargaining. More important though is the 
cases in which countries with no previous traditions for institutionalised corporation have created 
new forms of consensus-seeking arrangements by linking incomes policies to broader social 
bargaining using national tripartite deals – e.g. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece (Rhodes 2003, 
132f.). The full development thus is complex, but several general trends are visible. First, most 
countries operating under the constraints imposed by EMU have begun to see consensus-seeking 
  
arrangements as important mechanisms to produce comparative advantages. Second, in these 
countries attempts are made to create comparative advantages by the coordination of incomes 
policies with broader employment and social policy measures. Third, the coordination has come 
more than ever before to include multiple agents (political, social and economic), as well as 
manifold levels of agency (transnational, national, regional, local and company level) and numerous 
policy arenas (employment, welfare, growth, income, industry, innovation, entrepreneurship) (Treu 
1992). New systems of governance accordingly are more complex, more multi-level and more 
interlocking, but also less static and more dynamic than traditional neo-corporatist or neo-pluralist 
arrangements. Still it is a general and important feature that new mechanisms for coordination have 
been developed for the creation of institutional complementarities. Examples can be found in the 
previous description of either internal or external flexibility where a number of different policies 
(employment, family, social, education, and others) are constantly being coordinated as a 
precondition for the flexibilization of working conditions. Also flexicurity is an example of how 
flexibility is coordinated with security in attempts to facilitate transitions at the labour market. The 
current consensus-seeking arrangements are thus characterised by something entirely different from 
the post-war neo-corporatist or neo-pluralist arrangement. Instead of being based on legislated, rule-
governed, and mostly centralised wage bargaining, new forms are open for on going 
experimentation and learning. Attempts are made to facilitate transitions at the labour markets and 
to enhance the adaptability of labour markets by constant experimentations with institutional 
complementarities (Pedersen 2006a, 260-65). At the present no fixed or stabilised arrangements can 
be found. On the contrary the constant flux of arrangements seems to be the order of the day; new 
institutions are created and old ones abolished, in some cases even from negotiation to negotiation. 
In most cases though macro- and micro-policies are combined, and the policy stream can go 
bottom-up (decentralised) as well as top-down (centralised). Also social actors representing 
organized interests are mixed with representatives from single firms, from single groups of 
employees and from local authorities, municipalities and regions. All this has led to the creation of 
several types of agreements37. It is this constant renegotiation of the interplay between political, 
company and social partners that has been duped competitive corporatism (Rhodes 1998). Thus the 
first point to exemplify competitive corporatism is that renegotiation or dynamic change has 
become a functional imperative (Rhodes 2003, 130; Pedersen 2006b). The second is that the object 
of these experiments is to create comparative advantages by establishing institutional 
                                                 
37 See for extensive descriptions Molina & Rhodes  2002, Rhodes 2003; Traxler 2000; Traxler et al. 2001; Pedersen 
2006a. 
  
complementarities. The third is that the new state-society relations is binding and encumbering, i.e. 
that the parties enter into relationships with the object to bind each other to agreements which the 
parties themselves are then responsible for implementing making governance instead of government 
a system of authority. In this manner, competitive corporatism is an expression of the fact that 
management of governance or reflections on how to manage processes of coordination have 
become an important issue for all member states, and that member states have been pushed to 
rethink established approaches and to re-examine their governance systems. Hence what is 
characteristic for most countries is the present institutional experimentation and innovation, but also 
the fact that experimentation has established a general trend in the direction of institutional 
flexibility, i.e. the constant renegotiation of the agents to be included (or excluded), the policies to 
be interlocked (or unlocked), and the processes to be used for coordination. In several countries a 
step towards creating meta-institutions to manage such processes has been established. In Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark for example governments have created so-called Globalisation Councils 
(GCs) to negotiate national strategies for routine transformations in the organisation of relations 
between social partners and governments38. I others we see how governments are using models and 
templates from OECD and EU and others in managing reform processes. All as a precondition for 
establishing internal and external flexibility in accordance with constraints imposed by the EMU 
and experiences facilitated by the OMC. 
5. Institutional Competitiveness Revisited 
 
Hence the most important point made so far is this: That the concept that nations compete has 
become (almost or nearly?) dominant and that procedures (like those included in “The post-
Washington Consensus”) and processes (like the OMC) by now is moving the process towards an 
even greater dissemination and an even deeper development of the discourse and the institutions. 
Whether nations really compete is of course still contested. My point is different! Even if nations do 
not compete, or even if the notion that nations compete is a “dangerous obsession”, there is by now 
an established set of institutions and of expert systems making it possible for policy makers and the 
like to act as if they do. Thus the notion is penetrating more deeply into the public discourse of 
                                                 
38 These councils differ from the already mentioned National Competitiveness Councils (NCPs). Where NCPs deal with 
the overall competitiveness of the national economy, GCs are concerned with meta-governance, i.e. how to manage 
ongoing changes in systems of governance. However, there are also some common features. The leadership structure of 
NCPs and GCs relies on strong support from the highest level of political authority, but also from designated private 
sector managers (CEOs and chairmen of national interest organisations).  
 
  
national policies, and reform plans which bear the stamp of this notion are being implemented by 
national governments. The same can be said with respect to negotiations within the EU, and with 
policy proposals formulated by the IMF, the WB, the OECD, and with proposals put forward by the 
great number of private think tanks, consultancies and expert groups now operating both 
internationally and in nations. Indeed if one digs a little deeper, one finds an almost universal 
restructuring of international economic relations and national models of regulation all going in the 
same direction of enhancing the ability of nations to compete and of international organisations to 
facilitate their competition. Two current examples to emphasize this point: A first example is 
reform of the national education systems in the OECD’s member countries. Many European 
countries have implemented changes in their education- and welfare legislation with the object of 
strengthening the individual citizen’s motivation to understand work – or the lifelong commitment 
to employability – as the most important aspect of being a citizen in a national (or local) 
community. The OECD’s annual PISA survey plays an important role here, not simply by making it 
clear that nations compete and that they so do on the basis of the competences of their citizens, but 
also by making it obvious that it is the work-related skills which in themselves are a parameter of 
competition (OECD PISA 2006). Following the inspiration provided by the PISA, debates on new 
forms of education were ignited, and these have already led to the formulation of education reforms 
and to changes in national legislation in several countries (Finland, France, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands). A second example is OECD’s latest initiative on 
“competitive cities” (OECD 2006b), where the big cities’ physical, social, educational, 
environmental, cultural and intellectual infrastructure is emphasised to explain why some cities are 
better suited to attracting foreign investment and highly educated manpower than others. These 
examples must however, be enough to support the point that a routine has been established for the 
dissemination and development of the concept that nations compete; and that as a result, nations 
have turned their policies “(…) into yet another educational tool for instilling in the population and 
the culture at large a spirit of enthusiastic participation in paid work” (Streeck 2007). It is against 
this background that I have defined international competiveness by its institutional features. And on 
this background that I assert that over almost 25 years, there has been a gradual development in the 
definition and in the use of the concept which places institutions at the centre for business 
managers, policy makers and international organisations alike when they measure competitiveness 
and produce strategies to create comparative advantages. By “institutional competitiveness” (CIC) I 
formerly understood the capacity of a country to achieve socioeconomic success relative to 
  
comparable countries as a result of its political and economic institutions (Campbell & Pedersen 
2007a, Pedersen 2006b). This definition can now be made more precise by emphasising two 
circumstances: (1) Nations compete by reforming the institutional (legal, political, economic and 
cultural) context for firms in an attempt to produce comparative advantages; e.g. by creating 
conditions for internal and external flexibility of working conditions. And (2) nations compete by 
deliberately creating institutional complementarities, e.g. by coordinating a number of policy areas, 
societal players and levels of government into governance systems equipped for mutual and on-
going learning and experimentation. This extended definition shows that institutions have become a 
political phenomenon and that analyses of institutions have become a policy tool, and that 
reflections on how to promote comparative advantages and to do so by the management of 
institutional complementarities have become an everyday matter for national governments and 
international organisations alike. Knowledge of institutions has come to be understood as a tool – 
and even as a functional imperative – for governments in competing with other nations and for 
international organisations in facilitating this competition.  
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